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THE RIGHT OF A LANDOWNER TO OIL AND GAS IN
HIS LAND.
From the time when petroleum first became commercially
valuable the courts have had to meet the question, what rights
does or can anyone have in natural oil before it has been taken
from the land. The same question has called for solution in the
case of natural gas and it has been tacitly assumed that these
questions are identical.
At times a court has sought to reach a definition, or, at
least a description of the nature of the right which a landowner
has to the liquid and volatile substances which can be brought
into physical control through the surface of his land. If the dis-
cussion of the question could be confined to the cases in which
this general proposition has been considered, there would be no
difficulty in formulating an answer, rational and certain; but,
unfortunately there are times when the courts, either because
they have not had time to consider or because counsel have failed
to present the fundamental proposition involved in their cases,
reach conclusions which seem to justify the inference that they
are indifferent to the existence of the primary division of things
physical into solid, liquid and gaseous. But whatever the cause,
there are many judicial utterances so inconsistent with the con-
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clusions reached in the cases where the nature of the right in
question has- been given careful consideration that a great confu-
sion has resulted. The object of this article is to clarify the sub-
ject, first by inquiring what the nature is of the right that the
landowner can have in oil and gas while still confined to the nat-
ural reservoir beneath his surface and then by drawing some nec-
essary inferences therefrom.
Some things are clearly established. It is established that by
boring a well or causing a well to be bored upon his land the
landowner becomes the owner of all the oil which may be brought
to the surface through this well; and although a stranger at his
own labor and expense takes oil from this well, it is, nevertheless.
when brought to the surface, the property of the landowner.' It
is established that if oil or gas escape by its own force from such
a well, one who is not the landovner but who is lawfully in pos-
session of the land, may appropriate it, and upon such appropri-
ation it becomes his property. 2 It is likewise established that the
landowner has a right to an unlimited production through the
well which has been sunk upon his land and in the exercise of
that right he may diminish or exhaust the supply of the wells
of his neighbors, and conversely, the exhaustion or diminution of
his supply by operations upon other lands does not, standing
alone, furnish him any ground of legal or equitable redress.3
While, therefore, all oil or gas. whatever its source, which
has been brought to the surface is the property of the owner of
the land through whose surface it is brought, he, nevertheless,
cannot so long as he has not brought it within his control by sink-
'Hail v. Reed, 15 B. Mon. 479 (Ky. 1854); Hughes v. United Pipe
Lines, iig N. Y. 423 (189o) ; People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 131 Ind. 277 (1891).
'Kier v. Peterson, 41 Pa. 357 (i86i); Wood County Petroleum Co. v.
\Vest Virginia Transportation Company, 28 W. Va. 210 (1886). In the latter
case it is also held that such an appropriation of gas may be made by a
trespasser.
*People's Gas Company v. Tyner, 131 Ind. 277 (i89r); Andrews v.
Andrews, 31 Ind. App. 189 (1903) ; Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324 (1893);
Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio. 317 (1897); Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Company, 194 N. Y. 326 (T9o8). Redress may be had only when the
supply of oil or gas is deliberately wasted for the purpose of inflicting
injury. Louisville Gas Company v. Kentucky Heating Company, 117 Ky.
77 (i9o3); Id. v. Id., 33 Ky. Law Rep. 912 (9o8); Hathorn v. Natural Car-
bonic Gas Company, .supra.
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ing a well, indicate any body of gas or oil which has a permanent
situs in his land. Whatever oil or gas may be there is not only
subject to removal by natural agencies, but is subject to being
drawn off and appropriated by other landowners. Now, as has
been pointed out by Mr. Chief Justice White, "it cannot be that
property as to a specified thing vests inwany one who has no right
to prevent any other person from taking or destroying the object
which is asserted to be the subject of the right of property".
4 It
therefore follows .that the 'andowner, who has not sunk a well
has no right of property in any oil or gas in or under his land.
What right then does a landowner have to the oil and gas in
his land which a stranger does not have? The first discussion
of this question appears in Hail v. Recd.5 In this case the de-
fendants had at their own labor and expense taken oil from a
well on plaintiff's land. In an action to recover this oil, plaintiff
prevailed. One ground of defence was that the oil in suit had
been "taken from a well bored down to a running stream of oil,
which was vague and fugitive, and had not been confined nor
ever reduced to possession, nor even in possession of plaintiffs".
It was sought to support this contention by drawing an analogy
between oil and water, which Blackstone says must unavoidably
remain in common, susceptible only of a usufructuary property,
belonging to the first occupant during the time he holds posses-
sion and no longer. The court held that these observations ap-
plied only to water found running upon the surface of the earth
and not to water running from a spring or in the bottom of a well,
which are the property of the owner of the soil.
"We know that in wells for drawing water it is usual, and
where the supply is small, necessary, to sink the well below the
point where the water enters it, so that it may be retained there
in sufficient quantities for use, and for drawing it up. There is
nothing to show that this was not the case in the present in-
stance, and the jury might have so found. But we are of opin-
ion that whether the water or oil is running through the well
in a stream or not, that which is actually in the well is, while it
is there and subject to be drawn out, though it be there only in
passing from one side of it to the other, appropriated by the
'Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 1go, 2o1 (I9oo)..
a iS B. Mon. 479 (Ky. x854).
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owner to his own use, and belongs to him when it is drawn out,
unless this is done by his license and for another's use. If,
as may be presumed, the well is sunk below the point at which
the water or -oil enters, or if the water or oil, in any quantity,
stands in it until drawn-out, the evidence of appropriation is
still stronger, and the right of the owner more easily estab-
lished. And in either case the water or oil, if drawn up by a
wrongdoer, is the property of the person entitled to the well,
or its exclusive use, and may be specifically recovered."
We thus find the thought in the mind of the court to be that
the landowner's property in the oil came from appropriation only,
and that the sinking of a well was the appropriation of so much
as remained in the well or was brought to the surface through it.
In the earliest Pennsylvania cases, the importance of settling
this fundamental question seems not to have been -appreciated.
Although a reference to it is to be found in the argument of coun-
sel in Funk v. Hahtnzan,6 Mr. Chief Justice Woodward concludes
his elaborate opinion in that case with the statement that he has
treated oil as a mineral, 7 and that until our scientific knowledge
on the subject was increased, the courts would be very likely to
regard this valuable production of the earth in that light. Nev-
ertheless, in the following year we find Mr. Justice Strong" say-
ing, "Oil is a fluid, like water, it is not the subject of property ex-
cept while in actual occupancy". 9
The next discussion of the subject appears in a case in West
Virginia ° in which it was decided that a lessee of a tract of land
"for the purpose of mining and excavating for rock or carbon
oil" and "for said purpose only" was entitled to take and use
natural gas which came to the surface through the oil well. The
court reasons thus:
"While the grant is for the specific purpose of mining for
and removing carbon oil and for none other, still there is neces-
6 53 Pa. 229 (1866).
THe held the same view in his dissenting opinion in Kier v. Peterson,
41 Pa. 357 (i86i).
'Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. 164 (1867).
* This language is repeated in Shepherd v. McCalmont Oil Co., 38 Hun,
37 (N. Y. 1885).
"Wood County Petioleuin Co. v. Vcst Virginia Transportation Co., 28
W. Va. 210 0886).
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sarily included in this grant all the incidents essentially or nat-
urally pertaining to its enjoyment. Included in: these are the
elements, such as light, air and water. And having the legal
right to enter upon and occupy any portion of the premises the
appellant could, without becomiig a trespasser or incurring any
liability to the lessors, use and appropriate anything it might find
thereon, which is not the property of another, such as animals
ferae naturae, or waters percolating through the -land, even
though by such use and appropriation it may deprive another,
having an equal right, of the power to do so. These are not
the subject of absolute property, and being therefore jure nat-
urac capable of a qualified ownership only, they belong to him
who first appropriates them."
This conclusion is enforced by a thorough and exhaustive
consideration of the physical character of this natural product
and its capacity of flowing from place to place of its own accord.
It is pointed out that, it not being ascertainable from the plead-
ings whether the plaintiff sought to recover from the defendant
as an occupant of the premises by reason of the lease or to hold
him as a trespasser, the result is the same in either case.
"If, as before stated, this gas was not susceptible of abso-
lute ownership hut the subject of qualified property only, as
there can be no title or right to such property except by posses-
sion or appropriation, the plaintiff not having the possession
could have no property in it, and consequently could not legally
claim compensation therefor from the appellant."
In the meantime the courts of Pennsylvania assumed that
the fact that oil was a mineral, as had been stated by Mr. Chief
Justice Woodward, was sufficient to justify the decision of ques-
tions arising in connection with oil leases upon precedents drawn
fron'i the law applicable to leases of the solid minerals. It was in
consideration of this circumstance and no doubt having before
him the discussion in the opinion in Wood County Pctroleum
Company v. West Virginia Transportation Company that Mr.
Justice M-litchell delivered his opinion in the case of IVesim ore-
land Natural Gas Company v. DeWitt," where he said:
"The real subject of possession to which complainant was
entitled under the lease was the gas or oil contained in, or oh-
"1 1.30 Pa. 235 (x8f).
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tainable through, the land. The learned master says gas is a
mineral, and while in situ is part of the land, and therefore pos-
session of the land is possession of the gas. But this deduction
must be made with some qualifications. Gas, it is true, is a
mineral; but it is a mineral with peculiar attributes, which re-
quire the application of precedents arising out of ordinary min-
eral rights, with much more careful consideration of the prin-
ciples involved than of the mere decisions. Water also is a
mineral; but the decisions in ordinary cases of mining rights,
etc., have never been held as unqualified precedents in regard to
flowing, or even to percolating, waters. Water and oil, and still
more strongly gas. may be classed by themselves, if the analogy
be not too fanciful, as minerals ferae naturae. In common with
animals, and unlike other minerals, they have the power and the
tendency to escape without the volition of the owner. Their
'fugitive and wandering existence within the limits of a partic-
ular tract is uncertain,' as said by Chief Justice Agnew in Broiwn
v. 1'andergrift.1 2 They belong to the owner of the land, and are
part of it, so long as they are on or in it, and are subject to his
control; but when they escape, and go into other land, or come
under another's control, the title of the former owner is gone.
Possession of the land, therefore, is not necessarily possession
of the gas. If an adjoining, or even a distant, owner, drills his
own land. and taps your gas, so that it comes into his well and
under his control, it is no longer yours, but his."
These observations have become classical and have generally
been accepted throughout the oil producing states. For the next
ten years the discussion of the subject in judicial decisions con-
sisted mainly in reiteration of what Mr. Justice Mitchell had said
in that case and this led the court in Jones v. Forest Oil Con-
fany3 " to conclude "that tile property of the owner of lands in
oil or gas is not absolute until it is actually in his grasp and
brought to the surface".
Nothing was added to the discussion until the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Ohio Oil Company v.
Indiana,"4 in which it was decided that a statute of the State of
Indiana making it unlawful fo. any person, firm or corporation
having possession or control of any natural gas or oil well to per-
mit the flow of gas or oil therefrom to escape into the open air
-So Pa. 147, 148 (1875).
"194 Pa. 379 (i9oo).
u177 U. S. 190 (i9oo).
RIGHT OF LANDOI'NER TO OIL AND GAS IN HIS LAND 477
without being confined within such well, pipes or other safe re-
ceptacle, for a period longer than two days, was not a violation
of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. In this case, Mr. Justice White (the present Chief -
Justice) pointed out that the analogy that had been drawn in the
)eWitt case between oil and gas and animals ferae naturae failed
in one particular, for while in the case of things ferae naturae
all are endowed with the power of seeking to reduce a portion of
the public property to the domain of private ownership by reduc-
ing them to possession, in the case of oil and gas this power is
limited to the owners in fee of the surface of the land within the
area of the gas field. In the one case, as the public are the own-
ers, every one may be absolutely prevented from seeking to re-
duce to possession without divesting any one of private property.
In the other, the landowners could not be absolutely deprived of
their rights without a taking of private property.15 This right,
however, is a co-equal right in them all to take from a common
source of supply the two substances which in the nature of things
are united although separate.10 After an exhaustive considera-
tion of the cases that had arisen in Indiana, the court found that
they, in accord with the rule of general law, settled the rule of
property in the State of Indiana to be as follows:
"Athough in virtue of his proprietorship the owner of the
surface may bore wells for the purpose of extracting natural
gas and oil, until these substances are actually reduced by him
to possession, he has no title whatever to them as owner. That
is, he has the exclusive right on his own land to seek to acquire
them, but they do not become his property until the effort has
resulted in dominion and control by actual possession.""
1' See also Manufacturers Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil
Co., 155 Ind. 461 (igoo).
"This idea is developed in Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co.,
33 Ky. Law Rep. 912 (1408). "The right of the surface owners to take gas
from the subjacent fields or reservoirs is a right in common. There is no
property in the gas until it is taken; before it is taken it is fugitive in its
nature, and belongs in common to the owners of the surface." See also
Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 117 Ky. 77 (19o3).
11That this is a correct statement of the law of that State is shown by
the subsequent cases. Richmond Natural Gas Co. v. Davenport, 37 Ind. App.
25 (1905); N'ew American Oil and Mining Co. v. Troyer, 166 Ind. 402 (19o6).
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This statement of the rule is reiterated in Lindsley v. Nat-
ural Carbonic Gas Comnpany,'8 where Mr. Justice Van Devanter
said that "each surface owner in an oil and gas area has the ex-
clusive right on his own land to seek the oil and gas in the reser-
voir beneath, but has no fixed or certain ownership of them
until he reduces them to actual possession".
We now have two statements of the nature of the right
which a landowner has to the oil and gas underlying his land.
According to the Supreme Court of the United States he has not
a property right but a right through his surface to reduce the oil
or gas to possession and thus acquire title to it. According to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania he has no absolute property to
these substances in the ground but they belong to him as a part of
the land so long as they are on or in it and subject to his control.
It seems to the writer that the ideas expressed are identical; that
tle difference in expression arises from the fact that the federal
court is speaking of the right which the landowner has before he
has bored a well and struck the oil or gas, and the Pennsylvania
court is speaking as of the time after lie has done so." In other
words, the expression in Westmoreland Natural Gas Company v.
DelVitt,2 "subject to his control", is the equivalent of the ex-
pression "reduced to actual possession" used by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
While this rule was being developed, however, a discordant
note had been struck by the Supreme Court of Vest Virginia in
Williamson v. Jones,2 1 where, with the DeWitt case before it, it
decided that oil is a mineral and being a mineral is part of the
realty like coal or any other natural product which in siti forms a
21
U220 . S. 6r (1910.
"Tested by these principles, there is not the slightest doubt that the
possession of the gas, as well as the right to it under this lease, was in the
complainants when the bill was filed. They had put down a well, which had
tapped the gas-bearing strata, and it was the only one on the land. They
had it in their control, for they had only to turn a valve to have it flow
into their pipe, ready for use. The fact that they did not keep it flowing,
but held it generally in reserve, did not affect their possession any more
than a mill-owner affc th ihe cmitintan-e of his water-right when he shuts
his sluice-gates."
130 Pa. 235 (19oo).
"39 W. Va. 231 (1894).
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part of the land.22 In reaching this conclusion the court says that
it does not understand that Wood Coutly Petroleum Company v.
IVest Virginia Transportation Company lays down a different
doctrine even as to natural gas when it is confined in the strata
where if is found, but that the landowner's right to property in
that substance is only lost when it escapes out of his possession,
and the court seems to regard gas while in the land or under the
land as ipso facto subject to the owner's control.23 -The conclu-
sion, therefore, is that the owner of undeveloped land owns,-
has a right of property in,--the oil and gas which may be in or
under his land.
The West Virginia rule seems indefensible on any reason-
able ground. It conceives the possibility of a person having a
property right in a thing of which another may lawfully at will
deprive him. This attributes ownership to a state of facts which
is a denial of an essential element of property.2 4  This result is
reached not by a mere failure to observe the consequences of the
conclusion reached, but by a deliberate identification of things
which are essentially different. Coal and.iron are mirierals; oil
and gas are minerals. Therefore, concludes the court, as the sub-
ject of property rights there can Ie no difference between them.
But the fact that they are minerals does not affect the question to
"Vilson v. Youst. 43 INW. Va. 8--6 (1897); Williamson v. Jones, 43 W.
Va. 562 (1897).; South Penn Oil Co. v. Melntire, 44 W. Va. 296 (1898).
" In this view, the expression "subject to his control" used in the DeWitt
case is treated as in apposition to "in or under the land", and not as an
additional qualification. rt is submitted that this is not a reasonable inter-
pretation of the language of the court. Currency has been given to his
erroneous interpretation and to the conclusions that have been drawn from
it by the decision of Mr. Justice Shiras in Brown v. Spilman, i55 U. S. 663
(1895), who in paraphrasing the language of Mr. Justice Mitchell has
changed the word "and" to "or". In that case this seems to have been a
slip of the pen, hut the error has been perpetuated by the quotation of his
language in Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Freeman. 68 Kans. 691 (x9o4), and partially
at least explains the disposition of the courts of that State to follow the
Vest Virginia doctrine as explained below.
:"*For ownership, as the entirety of legal powers of use and disposal,
must include, as the one thing by which alone the rest can be made effective,
the right to maintain or claim possession; a right which, though it may he
suspended or deferred, cannot be wholly dissociated from an owner's rela-
tion to the thing owned." Pollock, First Book of Jurisprudence, 16. The
owner's' "right is in general that the object shall neither be taken away
from him, nor impaired in value, nor shall his title to it be weakened." Hol-
land, Jurisprudence (6th ed.) 182.
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be determined, which is, whether they are a permanent part of
the land. That the solid minerals while in place are so is clear.
That the liquid and gaseous minerals are not so becomes equally
clear, when it is admitted that they may be withdrawn from the
land against the owner's will, either by natural forces or by
human agencies exercised on other land.
The view of the Pennsylvania and federal courts therefore,
as developed above, furnishes the only rational answer to the in-
quiry which was propounded at the beginning of this paper,
namely, what is the nature of the right that the landowner can
have in oil and gas while still confined in the natural reservoir
beneath the surface. The answer is that he has the exclusive
right on his own land to seek-the oil and gas in the reservoir be-
neath; until he has by boring a well struck oil or gas he has no
property in them either separately from or as a part of the land;
when he has drilled a well through which they may find their
way or be brought to the surface then they are his property so
long as they are in the land and subject to his control.
Having determined what right the landowner can have in
oil and gas in the earth, it should he a simple task to determine
what right to such oil and gas he can convey. This is a corrol-
lary to the first proposition and its expression must be a direct
deduction from the solution of that proposition. This subject,
however, has by the decided cases been involved in considerable
confusion because the courts have repeatedly sought to. deter-
mine what rights have been conveyed without giving any consid-
eration to the primary question of the nature of the rights
possessed.
If the landowner's right is only the right to explore and,
when oil or gas is found, reduce it to possession, it necessarily
follows that he cannot transfer to another any greater right. The
right which he has he can transfer either by itself, or as an ap-
purtenance to a conveyance of the land, or an interest or a lim-
ited estate in the land. but he cannot convey the oil and gas or
either of them as corporeal things in place beneath the surface.
The division of strata of solid minerals from the overlying and
unlerlying" sil. and the conveyance of such strata separately as
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land; the creation of a separate estate in such minerals as land
distinct from the estate in the surface; these are things long fa-
miliar to the law. But, if the landowner's right to underlying oil
and gas is only the right to search for them and when found ap-
propriate them, no such conveyance can be made of these min-
erals, no separate estate in them as land can be created. The
courts of the oil producing states, except Vest Virginia and
Kansas, have, after some vacillation reached this conclusion.
This subject was first considered in the case of Dark v.
Johston.25  The instrument under consideration in that case
passed no present estate either corporeal or incorporeal and the
action of ejectment which the 'plaintiff had brought could not
have been sustained even if its subject had been an interest in
solid minerals. It was argued. however, by counsel that the in-
strunient amounted to a sale of the oil itself and that oil being a
part of the land was a corporeal hereditament, to recover pos-
session of which, ejectment would lie. On this subject Mr. Jus-
tice Strong said:
"'Oil is a fluid, like water, it is not the subject of property
except while in actual occuplncy. A grant of water has long
been considered not to be a grant of anything for which an
ej(.ctment will lie. It is not a grant of the soil upon which the
water rests ... It would confound all legal notions were it
held that an action can be maintained for the recovery specifi-
cally' of the possession of a subterranean spring or stream of
water; no miatter whether the waters are mineral or not. There
is a manifest difference between a grant of all the coal or ore
within a tract of land, or even the grant of an exclusive right to
dig, take and carry away all the coal in the tract (which we held
in Caldwell v. Fuiton to be a grant of a corporeal interest), and
a grant of the waters in or on the tract. The nature of the sub-
ject has much to do with the rights that are given over it, and
to us it appears that a right to take all the oil that may be found
in a tract of land. cannot be a corporeal right."
Notwithstanding this plain statement of the law, Mr. Jus-
tice Gordon in Stoughton's .4ppeal,2 basing his opinion upon
the dictini in Funk v. Hademan. held that oil is a mineral and
35; Pa. 164 (18671,
"t88 Pa. 198 01879).
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being a mineral is part of the realty and that in this it is like
coal or any other natural product which it situ forms part of
the land and "whenever conveyance is made of it, whether that
conveyance be called a lease or a deed, it is in effect the grant of
part of the corpus of the estate and not a mere incorporeal right.
In the case above cited, [Funk v. Haldeinan], this is said to be
so as to leases of coal land for the purpose of mining, and there
is no reason why the same doctrine should not apply to oil
leases." It is clear that the reasoning in Dark v. Johnston had
not been brought to the attention of the court. However that
may be, the court could have decided the point at issue in
Stoughton's Appeal without resorting to its extreme statement
as to the nature of the estate conveyed. The point decided was
that a guardian under his ordinary powers to lease his ward's
property could not lease a piece of real estate for the term of
twenty-one years for oil purposes without the approval of the
Orphans' Court. This was precisely such a lease as those which
were before the same court in Duke v. Haguc27 and Brown v.
Beechcr,2- in which the lessee was held to take an estate for years
in the land for the purpose of mining. "He is not an absolute
owner of the whole of the oil, as he would be were all the oil in
place conveyed to him in fee." While, therefore, the Pennsyl-
vania court at that time in terms recognized the possibility of a
conveyance of oil in place as land, the lease in Stoughton's Appeal
was not such a conveyance.
Nevertheless, after the decision in Stoughton's Appeal,
there was a persistent opinion on the part of the Bar of Penn-
sylvania, which was shared by the Bench, as is illustrated in the
above quotation from Duke v. Hague, that property in oil in
place no wise differed in nature from property in the solid min-
erals, and that a conveyance of oil in place as a corporeal thing
was not obnoxious to the law. This opinion persisted notwith-
standing the views of Mr. Justice Mitchell as expressed in
IVestmoreland Natural Gas Company v. DeWitt."-  His illumi-
io7 Pa. 57 (1884).
12o Pa. 59 (1888).
Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324 (1893) ; Cassell v. Crothers, 193 Pa. 359
("899).
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nating sentences however began to bear fruit in Greensburg Fuel
Company v. Irwin Natural Gas Cowipady.-0 In this case there
had been excepted and reserved from the operations of a grant of
a tract of land "the gas well upon the said premises and all the
materials and machinery therewith, and regress and egress to and
from the same, and all the natural gas in and underlyihg the said
tract or piece of land aforedescribed, and all the gas rights and
privileges necessary or useful in the production and transporta-
tion of the said gas therefrom." The rights under this reserva-
tion having vested in the Irwin Natural Gas Company, a special
writ of fieri facias under the Act of April 7, x87o, was issued
against this company under which was sold all-of its property,
franchises and rights except land held in fee. The court held
that the oil rights in question were not land held in fee because
the exception in the Act of April 7, x870, was limited to lands
not dedicated to corporate purposes or essential to the exercise of
the corporate franchises, but independently of this, the court said
that there were other considerations which confirmed its view.
"These arise from the nature and quality of the property
mortgaged. A right to take gas from the land or water from
the spring of another for private use or consumption is not land
held in fee and the appliances and privileges necessary to the
enjoyment of the right are not."
Finally in i9o6 a case reached the Supreme Court of this
State in which the question under discussion was squarely met. 31
Keys, being the owner of a tract of land, granted to Kelly the ex-
elusive right to mine and produce therefrom petroleum and nat-
ural gas, with possession of so much of the land as might be nec-
essary for such purposes, for a term of two years. Kelly having
exercised no rights under the grant and not having entered into
possession, Keys conveyed a like right to others against whom
Kelly brought ejectment. The court below held that the action
would lie. This was reversed by the Supreme Court. Mr. Jus-
tice Stewart in delivering the opinion said:
"162 Pa. 78 (894).
* Kelly v. Keys, 213 Pa. 295 (1906).
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-In reaching his conclusion on the point reserved, the
learned judge gave full recognition to the binding authority of
Funk v. Haldcnia,, v" and the cases that follow it, wherein it is
held that the grant of exclusive privileges to go on land'for
the purpose of prospecting for oil, the grantor to receive part
of the oil mined, as in this case, doe. not vest in the grantee any
estate in the land or oil, but is merely a license or grant of an
incorporeal hereditament. This court has found frequent occa-
sion to assert its continued adherence to the doctrine of these
cases. Only recently, in the case of flicks v. American Natural
Gas Company,"3 it reasserted it without qualification. Once it
was determined that the subject of such a grant was an incor-
poreal hereditament, and not an estate in the land or oil, it log-
ically and necessarily resulted that it would not support an
action in ejectment. And this view has been steadily adhered
to. In no case has ejectment been sustained under such a grant,
except where possession has been acquired by the grantee, and
he had been wrongfully disseised."
"In no case is it held that the grant of an exclusive right
to mine for and produce oil, though it be a mineral, is a sale of
the oil that may afterward be discovered. When under such a
grant oil has been discovered, it is the grantee's right to produce
it and sever it from the sol; so much as is thus severed belongs
to the varties entitled under the terms of the grant, not as any
part of the real estate, however, but as a chattel, and only so
much as is produced and severed passes under the grant; as to
all not produced there is no change of property. It is expressly
so ruled in Funk v. Haldeman,3 and the same ruling was re-
peated and emphasized in the case next following on the same
subject, Dark v. Johnston.35 These were the first cases in which
grants of rights to explore for oil were considered and passed
upon by this Court."
_The reason for the rule thus established is to be found in
the peculiar character of mineral oil. This is very clearly indi-
cated in the earlier cases, where the distinction is drawn between
minerals which are fugacious in their nature, such as water, gas
and oil. and those which have a fixed situs and are necessarily
part of the land; and this distinction has been allowed with con-
trolling significance whenever oil in situ has been the subject of
the dispute. Both rule and reason are against the theory that
prevailed with the court below, to the effect that the mineral once
discovered, all that was in situ became in law part of the real
estate."
"53 Pa. 2g (x866). 0
'2o7 Pa. 570. 57 Atd. Rep. 55, 65 L R. A. 209(19o4).54Supra, a. 37.
55 Pa. 164 (1867).
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This opinion fixes the law of Pennsylvania.
36
The question has presented no difficulties to the courts of
New York. This was to be expected of the State whose courts
have decided 37 that the rule in Caldwcll v. Fulton3" was to be
limited to cases in which by the terms of the agreement and the
contemplation of the parties the whole body of mineral
-considered as of cubical dimensions and capable of descriptive
separation from the earth above and around it, and as it lies in
its place, is absolutely and presently conveyed. The thing sold
mu't be such that it can be identified as land, and severed as
land from the estate of which it forms a part."
Of course, the fugitive minerals cannot answer this descrip-
tion. In Shepherd v. McCalniout Oil Company39 under an agree-
ment by which was conveyed the exclusive right to mine, bore
or excavate for oil or other valuable volatile or mineral substance,
and to carry on mining to such an extent as it might be deemed
advisable, it was held that the grantee did not take a corporeal
hereditament and that title in fee to the oil in place did not pass
to him. "We do not understand that there can be any property
in rock or mincral oil, or that title thereto can be divested or ac-
quired until it has been taken from the earth."1
40
In Indiana the essential difference between the nature of the
property which can be had in natural oil and gas and that which
can be had in the solid minerals has been always recognized.
41
The clearest and most positive statement of the doctrine under
consideration is contained in the case of Heller v. Dailey.42 The
question in this case was whether a grant of all the oil and gas in
'The Superior Court in Hlutton v. Carnegie Natural Gas Co., 51 Pa.
Super. Ct. 376 (1912), disregarding the latest decision of the Supreme Court,
reiterated the language of Mr. Justice Gordon in Stoughton's Appeal. The
question was not necessarily involved in this case, but at any rate,' until
the Supreme Court retracts the reasoning in Keys v. Kelly, the decision
of the Superior Court cannot be accepted as an authority.
"Genet v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 136 N. Y. 593 (1893).
031 Pa. 475 (1858).
a38 Hun, 37 (C. Y. 1885).
'See also Wagner v. 'Mallory, 169 N. Y. 5oi (ixoa).
"Columbian Oil Co. v. Blake, T3 Ind. App. 68o (1895); Chandler v.
Pittsburg Plate Glass Co.. 2o -Ind. App. 165 (8W8); State v. Ohio Oil Co.,
iso Ind. 21; New American Oil & Min. Co. v. Troyer, 166 Ind. 4o2 (i9o6).
a28 Ind. App. 555 (19o2).
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and under a tract of land unlimited as to time constituted a con-
veyance of an interest in land within the meaning of the Statute
of Frauds. The court said:
"By its terms the contract is a grant of the minerals in and
under the land. If by such general terms all of a specified solid
mineral, as coal, in and under the land were granted, it would be
a grant of real estate . . . ; but. because of the fluidity and
fugitiveness of petroleum and natural gas, the absolute owner-
ship of these mineral substances within the land cannot be
acquired without reducing them to actual control, so that a dis-
tinction must be and is made between these elusive minerals
in and under the ground and the solid minerals in place in the
earth. Therefore. a grant of ail the oil and gas in and under a
tract of land is not a grant of any particular specific substance
as would be a grant of the coal in and under certain land.
"The owner of land is not by virtue of his proprietorship
thereof the absolute owner of the oil and gas in and under it,
in its free an(l natural state, not yet reduced to actual control of
any person. but he, together with the other owners of land in
the gas field, has a qualified ownership, consisting of or amount-
ing to his exclusive right to do what may be done on, through
and under his land (as making of wells) necessary to reduce the
minerals to his possession, and, by thus acquiring the exclusive
control, to become the owner of the mineral substances as his
personal property, observing due regard in his operations to the
like enjoyment of such exclusive right by all other landowners
in like circumstances. This exclusive right is his private prop-
erty. He cannot grant more than he owns; therefore, by grant-
ing all the oil and gas in and under his land, he does not grant
more than a right to reduce to ownership the oil and gas which
may be obtained by operating on the land, whereby substances
which, at the time of the making of the grant, may be in and
under lands of other surface proprietors, may come into rightful
ownership of the grantee as his personal property."
This doctrine also obtains unqualified adoption by the courts
of Illinois. In Vatford Oil and Gas Company v. Shipman" it
is held that these minerals are not capable of distinct ownership
in place.
"Oil and gas while in the earth, unlike solid minerals, can-
not be the subject of a distinct ownership from the soil. A grant
to the oil and gas passes nothing which can be the subject of
ejectment or other real action. It is a grant not of the oil .which
is in the ground but to such part thereof as the grantee may
find.""
0233 IlL 9 ( go8).
" See also Keller v. Ullery, 233 Ill. 56 (19o8).
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The precise question has not arisen, so far as the writer has
been able to find, in Ohio, but as the courts of that State have
adopted the view that these fugitive minerals belong to the per-
son who reaches them by means of a well and severs them from
the realty and converts them into personalty and that no one else
can have ownership in them,45 the writer feels justified in rang-
ing this State along side of Indiana and Illinois.
In Oklahoma also it is held that oil and gas while in the
earth, unlike solid minerals, are not the subject of ownership dis-
tinct from the soil and a grant of them is a grant not of the oil.
and gas that are in the ground but of such part as the grantee may
find and reduce to possession, and passes nothing that can be the
subject of ejectment or other real action."
In WXest Virginia, on the other hand, it has been consistently
held since the decision in lVilliamson v. Jones that no legal dis-
tinction is to be drawn, in determining questions of ownership,
between the solid minerals and the liquid and gaseous minerals. 47
In Preston v. I1hite it is said:
"Oil and gas in place are a part oi te ind itself. But when
the owner of land conveys to another the oil or gas, that oil or
gas becomes a property distinct from the residue or remnant of
the land; distinct from the 'surface', as the expression is in the
books. The oil and surface are then two properties under dis-
tinct ownership, but the oil none the less a real corporeal prop-
erty than the surface or soil itself. Being part of the land and
thus owned by the owner of the land, he can sever its owner-
ship .... ... hen thus severed in ownership, the owners own
two separate interests and are not co-tenants. WVhen thus
severed in ownership, the minerals become a separate corporeal
hereditament, and their ownership is attended with all the attri-
butes and incidents peculiar to ownership of land. Oil and gas
are minerals and fall under these principles."
'Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co.. 57 Ohio, 317 (1897); .Northwestern Ohio
Natural Gas Go. v. Ullery, 68 Ohio, 239 (i9o3).
'Kolachny v. Galbreath, 26 Okla. 772 (1o); Duff v. Keaton, 33 Okla.
92 (i92); Priddy v. Thompson, 2o4 Fed. Rep. 955 (19T3).
'"South Penn Oil Co. v. McIntyre, 44 W. Va. 296 (x898); Harris v.
Cobb, 49 W. Va. 350 (o0); Lawson v. Kirshner, so NV. a. 344 (9o);
Preston v. Mhite, 57 W. Va. 278 (1905).
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The Vest Virginia cases have been followed in Kansas, whose
courts have added nothing to the discussion.
48
Texas may be considered not positively to have declared
itself, for, while in Southern Oil Company v. ColquiIt4 9 it was
held that a conveyance of all the oil, gas, coal and other ininer-
als in and under the homestead of the grantor and his wife was
such a conveyance of a part of the homestead as required the
joinder of the wife under the Texas statute, yet in Bcnder v.
Brooks,"0 Kelly v. Ohio Oil Company is quoted with approval
for the proposition that the owner of the land has no specific
title to the oil therein until it has been removed from the earth.
In those states, therefore, which have recognized the true
nature of the landowner's right to oil and gas in his land, as de-
veloped by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, it is now held that he cannot
convey a right greater than he has. His right in those sub-
stances not being a right of property, he cannot confer on others
a property right in them. The clear apprehension of this nec-
esary proposition has been interfered with in Pennsylvania by
the persistent effect of the deductions which have been drawn by
Bench and Bar from the language of the judges who delivered the
opinions in Funk v. Haldemant and Stoughton's Appeal.52 It
is the writer's opinion that these cases have at last been reduced
to authorities only for the points decided by them, and that the
West Virginia rule that oil and gas in situ, like the solid miner-
als, may be conveyed as land and a separate estate created in
them as land apart from the surface now prevails only in Vest
Virginia and Kansas.
If this contention is correct, the classification of those in-
struments which are indiscriminately known as oil and gas
leases becomes much simplified. The landowner's right being
-Moore v. Griffin, 72 Kans. 164 (i9o5).
2 8 Tex. Civ. App. 292 (1902).
"io3 Tex. 329 (xgo).
as 3 Pa. 229 (I866).
'88 Pa. 198 (1879).
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only a right to explore and appropriate, he may transfer this right
either as an appurtenance to the conveyance of an interest in the
land. or without conveying any interest in the land. Those in-
strunents which effectuate the former purpose are true leases,
that is, of the land. Those instruments which accomplish the
latter purpose are grants of incorporeal hereditaments, licenses
and options.
John Stokes Adams.
Philadelphia.
